Review of Vito Tanzi, Government versus Markets:The Changing Economic Role of the State by Landes, Xavier
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Review of Vito Tanzi, Government versus Markets
Landes, Xavier
Published in:




Early version, also known as pre-print
Citation for published version (APA):
Landes, X. (2012). Review of Vito Tanzi, Government versus Markets: The Changing Economic Role of the
State. The Journal of Philosophical Economics, 6(1).
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
Review of Vito Tanzi, Government 
versus Markets – The Changing 
Economic Role of the State, New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2011, 
376pp, Hardback, ISBN 978-1-107-09653-0
Xavier Landes
The  Journal of 
PhilosoPhical economics
Volume Vi issue 1 autumn 2012
issn 1843-2298
copyright note 
no part of these works may be 
reproduced in any form without 
permission from the publisher, except 
for the quotation of brief passages in 
criticism.
The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012)2
landes, Xavier (2012) ‘review of Vito Tanzi, Government versus markets – The changing 
economic role of the state’, The Journal of Philosophical economics, Vi:1
review of Vito Tanzi, Government versus 
markets – The changing economic role of 
the state, new York, cambridge university 
Press, 2011, 376pp, hardback,  
isBn 978-1-107-09653-0
Xavier landes
in Government versus markets, Vito Tanzi, economist and former director of 
department of fiscal affairs at the international monetary fund, pursues three 
distinct objectives. first, he offers a historical account of the rise of the state, i.e. 
the increase in taxation and public spending. second, he elaborates a normative 
narrative for this rise that fits this historical account. Third, he defends the idea of 
a reorganization of the role of the state. By doing so, the book participates to recent 
works in political theory that combine a plausible, factual, account for the fiscal 
expansion of the state as well as a normative argument (e.g., Joseph heath (2011) or 
David moss (2002)).
Through reflections on the growth of public expenditures, the general intent of the 
book is to tackle the market failures view that emerged from Welfare economics 
(Baumol 1952; marshall 1920; or Pigou 1932), which postulates that public 
intervention on markets is justified by their failure to provide the positive outcomes 
they are supposed to provide (which is the best possible use of scarce resources). for 
Tanzi this view is unsatisfactory because it supports normative theories that ‘assume 
that the state’s intervention to correct for market failures is inherently benevolent 
and that the state is capable of correcting these failures administratively’ (p.4). The 
flaw goes beyond the capacity and intention of the state to correct market failures: 
a widespread idea is that, in presence of market failures, the state should replace 
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markets. consequently, governments have become more involved in the economic 
system, i.e. taxes and public spending have skyrocketed during the 20th century, at a 
cost of a decreased efficiency.
Government versus markets offers a rich factual account of the development of the 
state during the 20th century. The book offers also a quick presentation of different 
authors who highlighted different functions for the state: adam smith for the 
allocation of resources (pp.48-60), socialism and alfred Wagner for the distributive 
role (pp.72-79), and John maynard Keynes for stabilization policies (pp.82-85). This 
presentation extends to the voluntary exchange and public choice theories (pp.169-
192) as well as the ‘nordic european economic theory of fiscal policy’ (pp.193-204).
The central idea of the book is that public spending and taxing have been increasing 
since the beginning of the 20th century, with a clear acceleration from 1960’s to the 
mid 1990’s, due to diverse factors (innovations for tax collections, increase of the 
firms’ size, elevation of the expectations towards the state, etc.). among these factors, 
Tanzi highlights the role of ‘fiscal illusions’ (pp.152-157). as demonstrated by the 
literature on cognitive biases (e.g., Daniel Kahneman and amos Tversky (1974)), 
individuals suffer from distorted perceptions and evaluations. Governments have 
taken advantage of individuals’ inability to compute the real costs and benefits 
of public spending. Therefore, ‘fiscal illusions are not just random errors on the 
part of the taxpayers but also systematic, government-induced errors’ (p.155). if we 
reconstruct Tanzi’s normative point, the role of the government through taxation 
creates a major problem of agency that may be decomposed into two sub-issues: 
efficiency and autonomy. There is also a third problem regarding equity.
first and foremost, the economic expansion of the government is problematic in 
regard to individual agency. it may be interpreted as a breach of such agency since 
it has been mostly imposed on individuals through fiscal illusions. Without such 
biases, individuals would have never agreed to the rise of public expenditures. This 
traduces what Tanzi labels as a ‘forced contract’.
at several occasions (e.g., p.20, pp.108-109) Tanzi affirms that large governments 
have crowded out private initiatives. This critique is common among classic liberals 
and libertarians, who usually underscore the role played by private institutions, 
such as churches, professional guilds, friendly societies or unions in the furniture 
of social services (e.g., proto forms of social insurance) before the development 
of the state. This objection has two components. on the one hand, governments 
have replaced an efficient device (e.g., friendly societies) by an inefficient one. 
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in accord with the hayekian position (hayek 1945), the loss of efficiency is due 
to the difficulty of a centralized institution for dealing with the complexity of 
knowledge source or controlling local opportunism (e.g., free riding). on the other 
hand, the current scale of public involvement in private affairs violates individuals’ 
autonomy, grounded in the right to associate.
firstly, efficiency issues encompass pure economic efficiency (i.e. the level of 
outcomes the society gets out of a specific productive setting) and broader social 
efficiency (i.e. the impact of public spending on social indicators such as education, 
health, etc.) (pp.229-250). according to Tanzi, goods and services bought through 
the state would be a suboptimal deal for citizens in terms of welfare and well-being. 
With a lower level of taxation, citizens’ disposable income will be higher, so they 
could directly buy a large set of services such as health insurance or education from 
the markets.
secondly, governmental involvement is also objectionable in virtue of the disrespect 
to the freedom of association that is grounded in individual autonomy. again, 
this argument is common in the liberal tradition that values decentralized social 
organizations (levy 2003). The development of large states contravenes this 
fundamental right because one of the ‘fundamental assumptions’ at the origin of 
such expansion (p.13) (along with the presumed inability of private institutions 
to satisfy individuals’ needs) is the ‘myopia of citizens’. Thus, the invasive role 
of public institutions is based on a paternalistic stance regarding the capacity of 
individuals to perceive and pursue their true interests.
finally, there is also an issue of equity. Because the conditions for spending have 
been relaxed, the span of beneficiaries has expanded. While states originally 
directed most of their resources to the poor, now the benefits are distributed across 
the whole population. from vertical, redistribution has become mainly horizontal 
(pp.16-17): contributors and beneficiaries henceforth belong to the same income 
class. furthermore, some individuals use the state at their personal advantage 
(which could be interpreted as a violation of the original contract that ties people 
together).
Government versus markets does not call to shut down the state, but to reform 
by reorienting its activities from spending to regulation (i.e. providing better 
information, departing from universal assistance to targeted assistance directed 
to the “deserving poor”, etc.). The state should focus on making the markets more 
efficient instead of replacing them. This illustrates Tanzi’s diagnosis of the major 
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flaw of the market failures view: the postulate that, for any instance of (supposed) 
failure of the markets, public institutions should replace markets (p.316). however, 
it will imply for the state to retreat from some sectors where it has a quasi-monopoly 
(pensions, health, education) (p.25ff).
The book is rich and dense. it is topical in a time when the adequate role of 
governments is nurturing intense debates, accentuated by the current crisis of public 
finances. in spite of these obvious qualities, it suffers from important drawbacks. 
firstly, it is difficult to get a precise idea of the kind of state (e.g., p.25, p.321) that 
receives Tanzi’s favours. certainly, he advocates for regulation over taxation and 
spending, for the provision of better information to citizens and the removal of 
obstacles to competition. But these avenues remain underexplored and more space 
should have been devoted to the question “what kind of state is needed” instead of 
trying to prove the need for reforming the state and its economic role (point on 
which most of the readers would agree, in one way or another).
secondly, the argument of the book is perhaps too trivial: what is the difference 
between Tanzi and more traditional free-marketers? if the central idea is that the 
state should remove obstacles to markets, it is a restatement of some neoclassical 
position. moreover, the assumption that the market failures view defends replacing 
markets by governmental mechanisms is unfair and inaccurate. This view has been 
build around the idea of correcting market failures, not replacing markets. This is 
the principle of the Pigovian taxation: reintegrating the externalities within market 
prices for forcing market prices to include the social costs or benefits of a given 
activity.
Thirdly, the appeal to cognitive biases (‘fiscal illusion’) justifying the downscale 
of taxation and expenditures is troublesome. on the one hand, cognitive biases 
support Tanzi’s narrative that turns manipulation into the main dynamics. But, on 
the other hand, these biases disappear from his argumentation when he evaluates 
free markets. in other words, individuals would suffer from illusions and biases in 
their relation with the government (through taxation and public spending), but not 
during market transactions.
The treatment of the topic under consideration is partial. The book does not provide 
solid reasons demonstrating that free markets settings offer an environment less 
vulnerable to “illusions” than publicly managed environments, in spite of a large 
bunch of evidence coming from experimental psychology and economics (ainslie 
2001; ariely 2008; Gilbert 2006; Kahneman 2011; or Thaler and sunstein 2008). 
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moreover, if fiscal illusion is the central problem, it does not advocate per se for a 
retreat from publicly managed environments or a decrease of public spending, but, 
ironically, for more paternalistic policies…
fourthly, the implicit thesis of the book is that public spending has exploded 
because public institutions begun not only to allocate resources in order to promote 
efficiency but also redistribute income for egalitarian reasons and stabilize the 
economy for lessening the intensity of business cycles. By endorsing more diverse 
social objectives, public institutions have diverged from their traditional function of 
easing the allocation of productive resources.
The rise of large public spenders is presented as flowing from strategic behaviours 
(retribution of different groups within the society, some vested interests in public 
spending), irrational beliefs and myopic perception. however, one may wonder if 
it is the most plausible narrative. for sure, these elements have played a role, but 
the fact that industrialized states mutated from their minimalist forms in the 19th 
century to look like ‘insurance compan(ies) with an army’ (Paul Krugman) has to 
do with comparative advantages over markets in terms of efficiency, for handling 
collective action problems, moral hazard or asymmetry of information. The book 
lacks a discussion of these relative advantages in terms of efficiency, which is a 
point increasingly discussed in political theory (e.g., Joseph heath (2011), David 
moss (2002)).
regardless of these reservations, Government versus markets is a well-documented 
and topical book, which proposes a useful framework for apprehending the rise 
of the state as an economic agent by structuring such history around few main 
functions (allocation, distribution, and correction). it has an additional advantage: 
to show that the fiscal dimension, if important, is not exclusive. Too often, the 
intervention of the state in the economy is perceived as being about taxing and 
spending a great deal, which is reductive. The merit of the book is nevertheless 
to advocate for a more refined view of the state as an institution which role goes 
beyond taxing and spending.
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